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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Appellants, Fred, Dorothy and Dan Piecknick, operators 
of Piecknick Towing (collectively "Piecknick"), appeal an order 
of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania dismissing their complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  In their complaint, Piecknick 
alleged that appellees, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the 
Pennsylvania State Police, and several officials of the State 
Police1 (collectively the "State Police"), deprived them of due 
                     
1.  The officers sued in their official and individual capacities 
were: Glen Walp, Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police; 
 
 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when the 
State Police awarded towing jobs on state highways to a towing 
service which Piecknick alleges was not authorized to receive 
those jobs under a State Police assigned zone towing policy.2  
Piecknick's complaint sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1983 (West 1981). 
 We hold that the facts alleged in Piecknick's complaint 
fail to set out a deprivation of a property or liberty interest 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
order of the district court, but on different reasoning. 
 
 I.  Factual & Procedural History 
 Count I of Piecknick's complaint asserted a civil 
rights claim under section 1983 based upon a deprivation of due 
process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.3  It alleged 
(..continued) 
Captain Thomas Berryhill, of Troop S in Washington County where 
Piecknick is located; and Sergeant Duane Durham, also with 
Troop S. 
2.  Piecknick also alleged a due process violation under the 
Fifth Amendment.  The district court dismissed that claim because 
there was no federal government action.  Piecknick does not 
appeal the dismissal of this claim. 
3.  Count II alleged a pendent state law claim for harassment and 
intentional interference with business opportunity.  
Specifically, it alleged that the State Police intentionally 
called another towing company to service disabled vehicles 
knowing Piecknick was entitled to such business under its policy 
and practice, falsely asserted towing jobs had requirements 
Piecknick did not meet in order to disqualify it, failed to 
cooperate with Piecknick concerning traffic control at the scene, 
and threatened to arrest Piecknick at the scene without 
justification.  We need only address Count I's section 1983 




that the State Police established a rotational policy and heavy 
duty service list with specific zones (Zones 1-3) specifying 
which towing company would be contacted to remove vehicles from 
accident scenes on interstate highways in Washington County, 
Pennsylvania.  It also alleged that the State Police had 
established a policy and practice of limiting the assignment of 
towing services to a designated operator to only one zone.  
Piecknick is located in Washington County and was assigned to 
Zone 1.  A map outlining the zones as they existed for the past 
four years and designating the operators in each zone was 
attached to the complaint. 
 The complaint alleged Insana Towing ("Insana"), a 
competitor, was assigned to Zone 2 but has been receiving 
assignments in Zone 1, the zone in which Piecknick claims it has 
acquired property or liberty interests from the actions of the 
State Police.  According to the complaint, the State Police began 
referring towing in Zone 1 to Insana after operating for several 
years under a policy whereby Piecknick received all towing 
business in Zone 1.4  Piecknick alleged that it was contrary to 
past policy and regulations for the State Police to refuse to 
refer all towing services in Zone 1 to Piecknick and instead to 
refer towing services to another towing company located in and 
                     
4.  The facts show that another towing company, Burns, had 
previously been assigned to Zone 1 along with Piecknick.  Burns 
was removed from the list when it went out of business and 
Piecknick thereafter received all Zone 1 towing business for 
several years.  After this action was filed, Kolor Works Tow was 
assigned to Zone 1 along with Piecknick.  See Reply Brief of 
Appellants at 5.   
 
 
assigned to a different zone.  Piecknick argues that the State 
Police may not use Insana in Zone 1 because Insana was assigned 
on the map exclusively to Zone 2.  According to Piecknick, this 
action unreasonably interfered with its right to carry on its 
business and resulted in a 50%, or $40,000 per year, reduction in 
its receipts. 
 The "regulation" that Piecknick relies upon is actually 
a guideline setting forth procedures for state troopers to follow 
in placing towing and wrecker calls for abandoned or disabled 
cars on state highways.  The guideline was distributed to local 
towing services by State Police "[t]o advise service garages of 
Pennsylvania State Police Policy in regard to wrecker calls in 
accident cases and laws pertaining to same."  Appendix ("App.") 
at 15a.  The guideline also states that "[t]he Trooper shall 
contact the nearest available agency offering the required 
service."  Id.5  The guideline further states that the troop 
policy is to "[c]all the nearest available [towing company] for 
required towing service on a rotational basis."  App. at 15a.  It 
states that troop personnel will not recommend a wrecker service 
and will first ask if a particular wrecker is desired.  Id.  The 
communications room supervisor, not the trooper on the road, 
makes the decision on the nearest available towing service.  Id. 
                     
5.  The phrase "nearest available" is taken from the Pennsylvania 
State Police Field Regulations Manual.  See Bolus v. Walp, No. 
91-0678, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Pa. April 16, 1992), aff'd, 986 F.2d 
1408 (3d Cir. 1993) (table).  The State Police attached a copy of 
the field regulation as Exhibit B to its brief in support of its 
motion to dismiss.  See Supplemental Brief of Appellees at 7 n.3. 
 
 
at 16a.  If the nearest available service is unable to 
immediately respond or does not have the proper equipment to do 
the job, the next nearest available service will be contacted.  
Id.  This part of the guideline reiterates that "[o]ur policy is 
the nearest available to the scene on a rotational basis," id. at 
17a (emphasis added and in original), and also states that if a 
trooper at the scene makes an informed observation that a 
particular on-scene wrecking service is unable to safely and 
expediently see to the removal of a vehicle, he may request the 
services of the next nearest available service capable of 
handling the job.  Id. 
 Piecknick claims that it is entitled to receive all 
towing calls in Zone 1 because it is located closest to the state 
highway.6  According to the State Police, its towing policy, as 
expressed in the guideline, does not require exclusive use of 
only one towing service in each zone.  It reasons that this 
appears from the fact that more than one towing service was 
                     
6.  At oral argument, Piecknick stated that it did not assert a 
right to a monopoly in Zone 1; rather, it argued that its 
constitutional claim arose from the mere use of a designated 
Zone 2 towing service as one of the towing services in Zone 1.  
However, an exhibit attached to its complaint states otherwise.  
In a letter dated October 20, 1992 from Piecknick's counsel to 
the State Police, attached as Exhibit C to the complaint, 
Piecknick claimed a legal right "to receive all towing calls in 
Towing Zone #1.  The only exception would be if the firm was 
unavailable or did not have the requisite equipment for the job."  
App. at 20a (emphasis added).  This exhibit claims a monopoly in 
Zone 1.  We look solely at the allegations in the complaint when 
reviewing an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6), and Exhibit C is a part of the complaint.  
Therefore, we will consider both arguments. 
 
 
assigned to each zone as well as from use of the phrase 
"rotational basis" and the other provisions in the policy giving 
a trooper discretion to call another towing service if he or she 
believes one service may not be able to handle the job. 
 Piecknick's complaint alleged it complained in writing 
to the State Police and was later informed that an investigation 
had been undertaken "under the auspices of [one of the State 
Police defendant appellees,] Captain Berryhill."  Complaint at 
¶ 14, App. at 11a.  It never received any report of the 
investigation's findings or response to its attorney's inquiry.  
The complaint failed to allege that any individual State Police 
defendants were involved in the decision to use Insana in Zone 1, 
beyond a general allegation that using Insana on a rotational 
basis was "ratified and approved by the named officers in a chain 
of command."  Complaint at ¶ 15, App. at 12a. 
 The State Police moved to dismiss the complaint on 
several grounds, including lack of subject matter and personal  
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
(2) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Piecknick 
stipulated to the dismissal of the Pennsylvania State Police in 
its corporate capacity as a state agency and clarified its 
intention to limit its claims to those against individual 
defendants. 
 In an order dated November 29, 1993, the district court 
granted the State Police's motion and dismissed the complaint.  
In an accompanying opinion, the court held that Piecknick had 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
 
 
against any of the defendants.  Opinion dated November 29, 1993 
at 3.  The court first concluded that the section 1983 claims 
against the individual defendants in their official capacities 
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.  Id. (citing Will v. 
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) ("neither a 
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 
persons under § 1983")).  With respect to the individual 
defendants' personal liability, the court recognized that 
"[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages if their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  Id. at 4 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982)).  The court held that Piecknick's allegations as to the 
personal liability of the individual defendants "fail to 
sufficiently allege a violation of clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  Id.  Thus, it granted the State Police's motion to 
dismiss the section 1983 claim under Rule 12(b)(6) as to the 
individual defendants' personal liability.  It also dismissed the 
state law claims without prejudice for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction or, perhaps more properly, pendent or supplemental 
jurisdiction.  Piecknick filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
 II.  Jurisdiction & Standard of Review 
 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331 and 1343 (West 1993).  We have 
 
 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the district court's final 
order under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).7 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.  Jordan v. 
Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 
1994).  We must accept as true all of the factual allegations in 
the complaint as well as the reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from them, and dismissal is appropriate only if "no relief 
could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved."  
Ransom v. Marrazzo, 848 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1988); Jordan, 20 
F.3d at 1261. 
                     
7.  Contrary to the State Police's assertion in its Supplemental 
Brief, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 
89 (1984) ("Pennhurst II") does not bar this action.  
Pennhurst II held that a "federal suit against state officials on 
the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when 
. . . the relief sought . . . has an impact directly on the State 
itself."  Id. at 117; see Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. EPA, 
732 F.2d 1167, 1173-74 (3d Cir. 1984).  Pennhurst II did not 
address the Eleventh Amendment's bar of suits against state 
officials in federal court when the claims are based on 
deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.  
Allegheny County, 732 F.2d at 1174 (citing Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. 
at 104 n.13).  The fact that the federal due process right hinges 
upon a property or liberty interest created in part by a state 
regulation or policy statement does not make the cause of action 
any less federal in nature.  See Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358, 
365 (1991) (Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal section 1983 
action against state officials in their individual capacity for 
conduct undertaken as part of their state jobs and duties); see 
also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974) ("[S]ince Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), it has been settled that the 
Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official 
confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal 
right under the color of state law."); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property interests are created and 
defined not by United States Constitution but by independent 




III.  Property or Liberty Interest Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
 A.  Property Interest 
 To establish a section 1983 civil rights claim, a 
plaintiff "must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was 
committed by a person acting under state law and "'that the 
conduct deprived him of rights, privileges or immunities secured 
by the Constitution.'"  Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 989 F.2d 
117, 119 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).  Where a section 
1983 plaintiff claims a procedural due process violation, his 
claim is dependent upon the denial of a constitutionally 
protected property or liberty interest.  See U.S. Const. 
amend. XIV, § 1; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); 
Carter, 989 F.2d at 119-20. 
 "One alleging a property interest in a benefit 
protected by due process must go beyond showing an 
unsubstantiated expectation of the benefit."  Carter, 989 F.2d at 
120.  "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.  He must 
have more than a unilateral expectation of it.  He must, instead, 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."  Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).  Such property interests are 
"created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state 
law."  Id. 
 "A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' 
interest for due process purposes if there are such rules or 
 
 
mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of 
entitlement to the benefit[.]"  Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593, 601 (1972).  "The plaintiff must demonstrate entitlement to 
a property interest created expressly by state statute or 
regulation or arising from government policy or a mutually 
explicit understanding between a government employer and an 
employee."  Carter, 989 F.2d at 120.  In this case, the existence 
of a property right is an issue of state law.  See Abercrombie v. 
City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1990) (tow 
service owner's claim of property interest created by Oklahoma's 
wrecker statute was issue of state law).  Thus, we must examine 
the State Police towing policy and any applicable statutes or 
regulations to determine if a property right exists.  Id. 
 The guideline that Piecknick calls a regulation is not 
a regulation with any force of law.  It was never promulgated in 
accordance with the notice and hearing procedures required for 
regulations.  See Commonwealth Documents Law, 45 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 501-907 (1991); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 45, §§ 1201-08 
(1991); see also infra typescript at 25-26.  It is no more than a 
policy statement setting forth procedures that state troopers 
should follow when handling towing calls for disabled or 
abandoned vehicles on state highways.  The guideline itself 
states its purpose is merely "to advise service garages of 
Pennsylvania State Police Policy in regard to wrecker calls in 
accident cases and laws pertaining to same."  App. at 15a.  The 
guideline uses the express term "policy" in stating "our policy 
is the nearest available to the scene on a rotational basis."  
 
 
Id. at 17.  The guideline makes no commitments to any particular 
service or zone; rather, it states only that the trooper will 
call the nearest available service on a rotational basis. 
 We do not believe that this guideline creates an 
enforceable contract between the towing services on the list and 
the State Police or otherwise gives any particular towing service 
a right to receive all the towing business along the highways 
adjacent to or in any particular zone.  It is too vague and 
indefinite for that purpose and to enforce it as Piecknick asks 
would be likely to interfere with traffic safety and mobility on 
our state and interstate systems as disputes arose about a 
particular towing company's proximity, availability and 
capability to handle and respond to all the calls for towing 
within a particular zone.  We will, nevertheless, consider 
whether the guideline was created to satisfy any other governing 
state statute or regulation that could create a property 
interest, or whether the guideline itself or the parties' 
mutually explicit understanding based upon the State Police's 
past practices have given Piecknick a property interest in the 
towing business on highways near his place of business within 
Zone 1.  See Carter, 989 F.2d at 120.8 
 In Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 317-18 (4th Cir. 
1992), the court of appeals held that a wrecking service had a 
                     
8.  This is an issue of first impression for us.  We declined to 
address the issue in Bolus v. Walp, Civ. A. No. 91-0678 (M.D. Pa. 
April 16, 1992) (mem. op.), aff'd without opinion, 986 F.2d 1408 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 
constitutionally protected property right that prevented its 
removal from the South Carolina State Highway Department's 
wrecking service rotation list without prior notice or an 
opportunity to be heard.  In that case, however, state 
regulations required maintenance of the list: 
 [T]he regulations required every highway 
patrol district to establish wrecker zones 
and "wrecker-rotation" lists for the zones, 
S.C. Code Regs. § 63-600(A)(8), and directed 
that the lists should be administered fairly 
and in a manner designed to ensure that all 
wrecker services on the list have an equal 
opportunity to the towing business arising 
from the rotation list.  § 63-600(A)(10). 
 
 
Id. at 317; see also Abercrombie, 896 F.2d at 1232 (operator of 
wrecker service had property interest under Oklahoma law in equal 
number of referrals by city where state statute provided that 
list of wreckers must be maintained and that agency should use 
nearest available wrecker on list on alternating basis); Gregg v. 
Lawson, 732 F. Supp. 849, 853-54 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (wrecker 
service taken off state rotational wrecker list pursuant to order 
prohibiting owners with felony record from being on list had 
constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on list 
because relevant agency regulations were more than mere internal 
matter and set forth formal procedures for removal or suspension 
from list to compel compliance with regulations).  These cases 
are distinguishable.  In all of them, a state statute or 
regulation gave a towing operator a property interest.  Here, 
 
 
there is no Pennsylvania statute or regulation governing towing 
or wrecker services.9 
 Piecknick's reliance on Pataula Electric Membership 
Corp. v. Whitworth, 951 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 302 (1992), is similarly misplaced.  There, 
the court of appeals held that the lowest bidder may have a 
property interest in an award of a contract if a state statute 
and regulation requiring competitive bidding and awards were to 
be made to the lowest bidder on contracts for state services.  
The property interest arose from the state statute requiring 
competitive bidding and a rule requiring that contracts be 
awarded to the lowest bidder.  Id.  Here there is no such statute 
or rule. 
 This case is also distinguishable from Stana v. School 
District of City of Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1985).  
There, a school district, pursuant to a state statute providing 
that all teaching positions in the school district must be filled 
from the three highest ranking people, had an established policy 
concerning placement and ranking on a state-required eligibility 
list.  Id. at 124.  Local school district policy provided that 
names on the list would be returned for four years.  This Court 
                     
9.  In addition, these cases from other jurisdictions all 
involved the removal of wrecker services from a call list.  The 
towers removed from the list were effectively barred from 
providing services in all towing situations where the police had 
authority to direct removal of disabled vehicles.  Piecknick has 
not been removed from the towing list and is still one of two 
towing services assigned to Zone 1.  This distinction becomes 




concluded that because remaining on the eligibility list was a 
prerequisite to a teaching position, the school district had 
created a constitutional property interest and a legitimate claim 
of entitlement to remaining on the eligibility list.  Id. at 125, 
126-27; cf. Newark Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, New Jersey, 
940 F.2d 792, 810-12 (3d Cir. 1991) (fire fighter applicants who 
were tested and added to hiring eligibility list for municipal 
fire fighter position did not have protected property interest in 
their ranking on list). 
 Because there is no governing state statute or 
regulation in the case now before us, we next consider whether 
the guideline itself, or the parties' mutual understanding, is 
definite enough to create a property interest entitled to the 
constitutional protection of due process.  In O'Hare Truck 
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 843 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (N.D. 
Ill. 1994), the district court held that a towing service did not 
have a property right in maintaining its name on an informal 
rotation list because "the 'mutually explicit understandings' 
that constitute property interests under the holding of Perry 
cannot be based on the representations of government officials 
who are not authorized to make such representations."  Id. at 
1233 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Durham v. Jones, 
698 F.2d 1179, 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (maintaining 
name on sheriff's informal rotating list of wrecker services did 
not amount to property interest because it was mere unilateral 
expectation on wrecker owner's part).  In O'Hare, the city's 
governing body was the only agency authorized to make such 
 
 
commitments and create such entitlement; hence, there could be no 
property right unless it had reviewed and expressed its approval 
of the practice of using the rotation list after observing the 
applicable law.  O'Hare, 843 F. Supp. at 1233, 1235.  Here, as in 
O'Hare, no state agency with statutory authority to do so has 
approved or authorized the State Police's towing policy in this 
case in the manner state law requires for the promulgation of a 
binding regulation. 
 We believe White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 
F.2d 1049 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 185 (1993), is 
particularly instructive here.  There the State Police divided an 
eleven mile stretch of state highway into three zones and 
assigned each zone to one towing company that would, when 
summoned, provide service.  Id. at 1053.  These assignments gave 
a single towing company an exclusive right to towing referrals in 
its own zone.10  Id.  Under that system, the State Police always 
dispatched the towing company assigned to the zone unless a 
disabled motorist requested another.  The State Police assigned a 
towing company to a zone for anywhere from two days to a year.  
The parties stipulated that the towing dispatch system was not 
specifically authorized by, or codified in, any state statute or 
regulation and that participation in the program was not 
contractual.  Id. 
                     
10.  Here, more than one towing service is assigned to each zone.  
Contrary to Piecknick's assertion, Piecknick never had an 
exclusive right to all towing in Zone 1.  See supra note 4. 
 
 
 The court of appeals held that the unilateral 
expectations of the towing service were insufficient to create a 
property interest.  Id. at 1062.  It did so based on a conclusion 
that New York law presumes a contract for services which makes no 
specific provision for duration is terminable at will.  Thus, it 
held that a state police assignment of a particular area of 
highway to a towing company was not a property right because the 
assignment system was not specifically authorized by any statute 
or regulation but was merely an informal system that did not even 
specify the duration of the assignment.  Id. 
 In Lipinski v. Dietrich, 578 F. Supp. 235, 238 (N.D. 
Ind. 1984), the court decided that even if a contract could be 
implied between a towing service and a municipality to retain the 
service's name on a list of towing services that police would 
call on a rotating basis, the implied contract was unenforceable 
under state law because it was impossible to ascertain the 
contract's terms.  In addition, the court concluded there was no 
mutually explicit understanding between the parties because 
neither the police nor the towing service had made any explicit 
representations about the term of the list's continued existence 
or the towing service's continuing availability, as required by 
Roth and Perry.  Id. 
 We believe the reasoning of White Plains Towing and 
Lipinski is persuasive.  Applying that reasoning to the facts, we 
note that here Piecknick does not have an exclusive right to 
provide towing in Zone 1 because other towing services may be 
called if Piecknick is not available.  Furthermore, the right to 
 
 
tow in the zone is dependent on availability, and the towing 
guideline itself does not set aside an exclusive territory for 
any towing service.  These facts weaken Piecknick's case because 
they belie Piecknick's contention that a map setting forth zones 
in which certain nearby operators are to be called on the basis 
of availability permits an inference that a towing service listed 
in one zone cannot operate in another. 
 We further note that the guideline's policy 
specifically contemplates the use of other services on a 
"rotational basis."  See App. at 17a ("Our policy is the nearest 
available on a rotational basis.").  Whatever this ambiguous 
phrase may mean, plainly it does not mean that Piecknick or 
anyone else has an exclusive right to all the towing services the 
State Police need to call on in Zone 1 or anywhere else.  State 
Police officers at the scene are permitted, in their discretion, 
to decide whether any particular wrecking service they have 
called is unable to safely and expeditiously remove the disabled 
vehicle after the wrecker arrives on the scene and, in that case, 
they may call the next nearest available towing service. 
 Not only does the guideline lack a prohibition against 
using a towing service assigned to a zone other than the one 
assigned to it on the map, but it fails to set any particular 
term during which a towing service will continue to get 
assignments within its primary zone.  Pennsylvania law, like that 
of New York, presumes that a contract for services having no 
specific term is terminable at will.  See, e.g., Booth v. 
McDonnell Douglas Truck Servs., Inc., 585 A.2d 24, 27 (Pa. 
 
 
Super.), alloc. denied, 597 A.2d 1150 (Pa. 1991); Darlington v. 
General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. 1986).  Thus, as in 
White Plains Towing, whatever rights Piecknick may have had are 
terminable at will.  See White Plains Towing, 991 F.2d at 1062; 
Lipinski, 578 F. Supp. at 238.  We recognize that Pennsylvania's 
strong presumption in favor of employment at will has been 
weakened in some cases involving the rights of public employees, 
see 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1422, 1423 (West 1991); see also Kraoja 
v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 359-60 (Pa. Super. 1993), but we 
do not believe those cases apply to situations such as this where 
the state directs third parties facing an emergency need for a 
service to an independent contractor.  Piecknick has no rights as 
an employee of the state because he is a mere supplier of 
services.  See San Bernardino Physicians' Servs. Medical Group v. 
County of San Bernardino, 825 F.2d 1404, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(professional corporation of physicians' four-year contracts, 
containing automatic one year extension, with county-operated 
medical center to provide emergency services which could be 
terminated only "for cause," did not create property interest and 
analogy to employment contracts failed because corporation was 
not employee of state, but rather was mere supplier of services). 
 The guideline at issue here is not a regulation having 
the force of law.  The towing policy does not prohibit the State 
Police from using Insana as a towing service in Zone 1 simply 
because Insana may also service Zone 2.  The State Police are not 
required to continue towing assignments to an area designated in 
the zone map for any particular period of time, and there was no 
 
 
mutual understanding that Piecknick, as a Zone 1 operator, was 
exclusively entitled to the Zone 1 towing.  Piecknick cannot 
point to any other governing state law or regulation that creates 
a federally protected property interest guaranteeing it the right 
to provide towing services in Zone 1, to the exclusion of other 
towing services which may also be represented in other zones.  
Accordingly, Piecknick has not alleged any property interest 
entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
 B.  Liberty Interest 
 The right to hold specific private employment and to 
follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental 
interference comes within both the 'liberty' and 'property' 
concepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Greene v. 
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); see also Truax v. Raich, 239 
U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ("the right to work for a living in the common 
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the 
personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure"); Cowan v. Corley, 814 F.2d 
223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 "[T]he Constitution only protects this liberty from 
state actions that threaten to deprive persons of the right to 
pursue their chosen occupation.  State actions that exclude a 
person from one particular job are not actionable in suits . . . 
brought directly under the due process clause."  Bernard v. 
United Township High Sch. Dist. No. 30, 5 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th 
 
 
Cir. 1993).  "'It is the liberty to pursue a calling or 
occupation, and not the right to a specific job, that is secured 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.'"  Id. (quoting Wroblewski v. City 
of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
 In Cowan, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit considered a case in which a wrecking company had 
alleged a property or liberty interest because the local sheriff, 
in disregard of a service call list, gave certain wrecker 
companies preferential treatment in the assignment of calls.  
After complaining to the sheriff, the plaintiff was expelled from 
the wrecker association and was therefore barred from receiving 
further county business.  Although it concluded there was 
probably no property interest, the court of appeals held that the 
district court should have considered whether a liberty interest 
existed.  Cowan, 814 F.2d at 228.  The court of appeals expressed 
no opinion on the existence of any liberty interest but simply 
reversed the district court's order granting dismissal of the 
section 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim and remanded 
it to consider, in the first instance, whether the complaint 
alleged a protected liberty interest.  Id. at 227-28. 
 There are at least two other district court cases on 
point.  In Nall v. Pitre, No. 88-965 (M.D. La. June 9, 1989), a 
towing service filed a section 1983 claim against a sheriff after 
he removed the tower's wrecking service from the rotating call 
list without allowing the towing service an opportunity to be 
heard.  The Sheriff moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 
towing service had not established a constitutionally protected 
 
 
liberty or property interest.  After considering evidence that 
the towing company had been on the list for nine years, 
evidencing an understanding sufficient to create a property 
interest, the district court held there were questions of fact 
about the intentions of the parties that precluded summary 
judgment.  The court recognized that no contract nor binding rule 
or regulation accompanied the list, which was developed and used 
without public notice, but it nevertheless determined there was a 
genuine dispute of material fact from which an agreement could be 
inferred.  Id., slip op. at 2-3.  Specifically, the court denied 
the motion for summary judgment in order to give the plaintiff a 
chance to prove the existence of a custom or practice from which 
a mutual understanding sufficiently definite enough to create a 
property interest could be inferred in the absence of official 
rules or regulations governing towing.  Applying Cowan, the court 
also reasoned, in the absence of any property interest, the owner 
of a towing service might have a liberty interest that would make 
his complete removal from the rotation list an unreasonable 
governmental interference with his right to pursue a livelihood.  
Id. at 3.  But see Stana, 775 F.2d at 125 n.1 (removal from 
teacher eligibility list could implicate liberty interest in 
following chosen profession but where plaintiff has not alleged 
publication of the list, she cannot claim deprivation of liberty 
interest). 
 Nall is distinguishable.  Piecknick was not threatened 
with a loss of its right to engage in the towing business.  It 
was not completely removed from the towing rotation call list, 
 
 
and it remained in the Zone 1 rotation.  The police merely 
substituted Insana for a company with which Piecknick had 
formerly shared Zone 1 rotation. 
 Cowan is also distinguishable.  There, the towing 
company became unable to compete for its fair share of the local 
towing business because the sheriff gave preferential treatment 
to plaintiff's competitors, and the towing business ultimately 
lost all ability to compete by virtue of being summarily expelled 
from the towing association that receives all county business.  
See Cowan, 814 F.2d at 225. 
 In Bolus v. Walp, the second district court case, the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to Pennsylvania State 
Police officials in an action challenging a State Police towing 
policy in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.  There, the plaintiff, 
Bolus Towing, alleged that the State Police failed to comply with 
the provisions of the Pennsylvania State Police Field Regulations 
Manual.  The section Bolus Towing relied on provided that the 
police should contact the nearest available towing service when 
towing service is needed.  After an accident on Interstate 81, 
the driver of the disabled vehicle asked the state police to 
contact the truck owner to authorize a towing service to tow the 
vehicle.  There was evidence that the owner of the disabled 
vehicle requested a particular towing service to do the towing, 
but the identity of the service the owner requested was not clear 
and the vehicle's owner changed his mind in favor of Bolus Towing 
after Bolus arrived on the scene and asked for the job.  One of 
 
 
the police officers on the scene refused to allow Bolus Towing to 
carry out the job unless it compensated the other towing company 
previously called.  The court observed that the Pennsylvania 
State Police Field Regulations were not promulgated in compliance 
with the Commonwealth Documents Law, 45 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 501, 1201-08 (1991), and thus the public was not invited to 
hearings or to comment upon them.  Relying on Chrysler Corp. v. 
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 (1979), the district court held that the 
Field Regulations provided no substantive rights11 because they 
were not promulgated pursuant to any mandate or delegation of 
legislative authority.  Bolus, slip op. at 6 (citing Chrysler 
Corp., 441 U.S. at 301).  The Field Regulations were merely 
internal departmental regulations, or interpretive rules, 
governing the police themselves.  Id. 
 Here, as in Bolus, the towing policy in Washington 
County was not promulgated in compliance with the Commonwealth 
Documents Law.  Thus, the State Police again argue that it does 
not have the force of law needed to create a property or liberty 
interest.  Piecknick responds that compliance with the Documents 
Law is not controlling in regard to Piecknick's liberty interest 
claim because Piecknick's claim relies on an established custom 
                     
11.  The district court alternatively held that the State Police 
policy was followed because it provided that where two towing 
services are located within a reasonable distance of each other, 
they may both be considered nearest, and which to call was a 
matter of indifference so long as there was no evidence of 
improper partiality.  The incident which precipitated the 
complaint involved in Bolus did not involve the regulations 
Piecknick challenges because there the officer acted upon the 
driver's request as to towing service.  Id. at 7. 
 
 
and practice concerning the division of tow work in Washington 
County rather than the written policy itself.  It argues the 
custom is itself sufficient to support a due process claim. 
 The Commonwealth Documents Law distinguishes between a 
"regulation" and a "statement of policy."  It states that the 
latter may consist of "[a]ny document, except . . . a regulation, 
promulgated by an agency which sets forth substantive or 
procedural personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, 
duties, liabilities or obligations of the public or any part 
thereof, and includes, without limiting the generality of the 
foregoing, any document interpreting or implementing any statute 
enforced or administered by such agency."  45 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 501.  An agency's policy statement must be promulgated in 
accordance with the Commonwealth Documents Law if it is to 
establish a standard of conduct with the force of law.  Compare 
Orbera v. Commonwealth, 497 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Pa. Commw. 1985) 
with Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Norristown Area Sch. 
Dist., 374 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. 1977).  Because of our conclusion 
that the Washington County towing guideline does not create any 
"substantive or procedural personal or property rights," 45 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 501, the Documents Law is indeed inapplicable.  
Nevertheless, we agree with Piecknick that failure to follow the 
Documents Law does not bar consideration of whether the towing 
guideline or any policy, practice or custom that arose out of it 
or out of a mutual understanding between the parties created a 
property or liberty interest. 
 
 
 Ultimately, however, we believe Piecknick's argument 
fails.  Although Piecknick's complaint alleges that it was the 
custom and practice of the State Police, over the past four 
years, to use only Zone 1 designated operators to perform towing 
in Zone 1, there is no allegation that this custom was to 
continue for any term.  Adding Insana, a Zone 2 designated 
operator, to the operators who the police could call on to 
perform towing services in Zone 1 is not an unreasonable 
interference with Piecknick's right to pursue its chosen 
occupation.  This case is distinguishable from those in which a 
person's license to pursue a chosen occupation is revoked or 
substantially interfered with, see Herz v. Degnan, 648 F.2d 201 
(3d Cir. 1981), or where there is harm to an individual's 
reputation, see Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 
1989).  See also Durham, 698 F.2d at 1181 (sheriff did not affect 
towing company's right to operate towing service or ability to 
perform towing for other law enforcement agencies where it 
refused to place towing service on call list).  It is the liberty 
to pursue a particular calling or occupation and not the right to 
a specific job that is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
See Bernard, 5 F.3d at 1092. 
 Accordingly, we hold that no liberty interest has been 
alleged in this case.12 
                     
12.  Because we have concluded that no property or liberty 
interest is implicated, we would not reach the issue of qualified 
immunity even if the issue of qualified immunity could be 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order dismissing the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6).13 
                     
13.  On appeal, Piecknick seeks to amend its complaint to 
refashion the state law claim of interference with business 
opportunity as a federal constitutional claim alleging "police 
harassment".  Brief of Appellant at 15 (citing Philadelphia 
Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends v. Tate, 519 
F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975) (police harassment can sustain cause of 
action under section 1983) and San Jacinto Sav. and Loan v. 
Kacal, 928 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (same)).  This 
issue is waived.  Piecknick never sought leave to amend its 
complaint in the district court when it had the opportunity to do 
so.  Because Piecknick did not raise this issue in the district 
court, we will refrain from considering it.  See Newark Morning 
Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932-33 (3d Cir. 1976). 
